

Document No. 1402

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, TANAKA, Kiyoshi, live at Hokkaido, Kamikawa Aibetsumura, Aza Tovosato 41. I certify that I have examined an article entitled, "SANGATSU, JUGATSU JIKENNO SHINSO," (True State of March and October Events) which was published in the March, 1946 issue of SEKAI BUTKA ("World Culture"), consisting of 15 pages of printed matter.

I further certify that the above described item is an extract from an article I wrote in 1933 while on leave of absence from the Japanese Army. The information contained in the article was obtained either from friends who were members of the SAKURA-KAI (Cherry Blossom Society) at the same time I was a member, personal knowledge and activities in the society, or in the course of official investigations which I conducted while assigned to the Investigation Division of the War Ministry. It is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

s/ K. TANAKA

WITNESS:

s/ Johnson E. Munroe
Investigator, IPS

Signed at Tokyo this 2nd day of October, 1947.

THE SO-CALLED "MARCH INCIDENT"

On the 9th of January General UGAKI made a decision to launch into the political world and organize a Cabinet.

On the 13th of January General UGAKI consulted about the ways and measures for reforming the nation, with SUGIYAMA the Vice War Minister NINOMIYA, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, KOISO, the Director of the Army Affairs Bureau, TATEKAWA the Department Chief, YAMAWAKI, the Chief of Operations Section, (on that day, however, Lt. Colonel SUZUKI Shinichi acted as his proxy), Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and Lt. Colonel NEMOTO (Positive Intelligence). At the beginning of January in 1931, Lt. Colonel NINOMIYA, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff showed Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO a note summarized as follows: "at this juncture when General UGAKI has come at last to launch into the political world, you are required to make a necessary plan for reform and present it."

Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, who trusted these words promptly accompanied Lt. Colonel SAKATA and myself into the branch room of the Investigation Division of the War Ministry and requested us to make a plan to begin activities at the suggestion of the Assistant Chief of the General Staff. Having considered it dangerous to believe these words at face value judging from the characters of General UGAKI and Lt. General NINOMIYA and the rumor about the "SAKURA-KAI" -- Cherry Society, Lt. Colonel SAKATA decided to confirm the real intention of the Assistant Chief again and to formulate two plans. (The one is a plan to reform the real state of things which serve the final purpose of the "SAKURA-KAI" and the other is to camouflage the "SAKURA-KAI" so that it need not be considered dangerous, or, in other words, to clearly specify that it is an extremely moderate organization, and the plan to be adopted shall be in accordance with the real intention of the Assistant Chief of Staff.)

Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO ascertained the real intention of the Assistant Chief in person, as a result of which he obtained the following information:

- 1) The military magnates who are agreeable to the appearance of General UGAKI are: Asst. Chief of the General Staff, Major General TATEKAWA, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, KOISO, Chief of the Military Service Section, YAGATA, Chief of the Appointments Section, TAMURA, Chief of the China Sections, SHIGEFUJI, Chief of the Second Section, Yamawaki. The attitude of the Vice-Minister of War is not clear.
- 2) Military forces may be used for the sake of the appearance of General UGAKI.
- 3) Military Units also have a full understanding.

- 4) As the programmes and policies of the future state to be established will be drawn up by senior officers, we are to devote ourselves to make plans as to how to seize the reins of government.

Thus we came to formulate the necessary plans regarding the foregoing. However, some senior officers stated that "the participants in this enterprise are to be restricted to officers under the rank of Captain because the livelihood of bereaved families could not be guaranteed in case of failure, as everyone would be sentenced as guilty and that therefore they should be limited to only those above the rank of Major."

This instruction greatly perturbed Lt. Colonel HACHIMOTO, Lt. Colonel SAKAMA and others. Then, both of them asked the senior officers for their special consent to my participation, as they could not formulate a plan without me in regard to the past research work. As a result of the assistance of the Chief of the China Section, I was at any rate admitted to participate in the enterprise. But as is quite obvious, it is quite absurd to make a plan of construction and that of destruction secretly. Instantly, it became impossible to practise the plan of holding the seized reins of power. Besides, it became evident that senior officers did not make any plan about the programmes and policies.

The circumstance having admitted of no delay, we decided to make plans for destruction and that for seizing the reins of government separately. The information obtained about the requirements necessary for deciding this programme at that time are as follows:

- 1) There was an extremely strong atmosphere among the Military head circles of venturing forth into the political arena.
- 2) The readiness for action of the Troops had been secretly completed.
- 3) The funds needed were to be appropriated from the secret funds without losing any time.
- 4) Dr. OKAWA, Shunji has decided to participate in it by calling for a volunteer force of about 10,000 persons mobilized from the proletarian classes (especially the mass populace party - TAISHUO).
- 5) The time of action is to be the day when the Labor Law Bill is introduced before the House.
- 6) Liaison with the authorities is to be maintained by Lt. Colonel HACHIMOTO.

Although we interrogated regarding details about the above-mentioned matters we received no satisfaction. (NOTE: Upon asking certain matters later among the said information there were great doubts as regards 1 and 2; but 3 was in fact only partially paid; and 4 was a fact.)

In short the present action planned by the military circles is nothing but a pure "coup d'etat". We were made to formulate a plan in order to realize the "coup d'etat" using military forces on a very limited scale by expecting that the upper officers would earnestly devise some other constructive plans — but being pressed for time, everybody is taking action in his own way without any proper control due to the lack of planning materials; above all it is said that Colonel SHIGEFUJI has joined hands with Dr. OKAWA and ruthlessly connected himself with the Proletariate Party, and according to what I understand, had been planning a destructive plan.

On February 7th, shortly after 3 P.M., we met at the residence of Colonel SHIGEFUJI at Shinagawa. Those present were Lt. Colonel SAKATA, Lt. Colonel NEMOTO and myself.

Colonel SHIGEFUJI said to me:- "As you are doubtlessly aware, those who are under the rank of Captain shall not be made to participate in the present Reform, but only you are an exception and even if the case should result unsuccessfully, you must not worry about the living of your bereaved family and you should take it easy as a certain plan is in a position to arrange matters satisfactorily, etc., etc."

After the discussion, SHIGEFUJI and others planned and decided upon a destructive plan, the outline of which is as follows:

- 1) A great speech meeting denouncing the Cabinet will be recently held at Hibiya conjointly by the three Proletariate Parties in order to exalt the spirit of overthrowing the Cabinet; and a demonstration towards the Parliament will be made as a reconnaissance preparation for actually carrying out the plan (although we have made minute plans regarding the matter, some are omitted here).
- 2) Seizure of the destroyed administrative power will be effected on the day when the Labor Law Bill is laid before the Diet. On that day, the Headquarters of both the SEIYO and MINSEI parties and the official residence of the Prime Minister are to be bombed. However, the bombs to be used shall emit loud explosive sounds but be of low casualty performance. The bombardiers are to mobilize 10,000 persons as per the plan of Dr. OKAWA, and the demonstration is to be carried on towards the Parliament from all and every direction; staff members with understanding shall be placed at the head of each column for maintaining discipline; bands with drawn swords shall be placed in each column in order to repulse naturally expected interference by policemen.
- 3) Troops shall encircle the Parliament by making an emergency call on the Pretext of protecting the Diet, who shall cut off all inner and outer communications, and the officers (principally members of the SAKURA-KAI /T.N. The Cherry Society/) shall be stationed beforehand on every road; and the staff members assigned to the various columns shall perform the said task.

- 4) At this point a certain Lt. General (whose name has been kept in secret to the last, and it is not clear even up to the present moment, but according to a rumor it is said to be Lt. General MASAMI) shall enter into the House accompanied by either Major General KOISO or TATEKAWA and several other officers, and declare to all Ministers that, "The nation does not confide in the Present Cabinet any more, but confides only in a Cabinet with General UGAKI as its Premier. As the country is now confronted by a grave situation you should meet the situation properly," and compel them to resign en bloc."
- 5) To compel acting Premier SHIDEHARA and others to tender their resignations.
- 6) In order to have General UGAKI receive an Imperial Mandate /T.H. to form a new Cabinet, matters shall be maneuvered as per preparations made beforehand. (Envoy to be despatched to H.I.M. Prince KAM-UN and Prince SAIONJI are decided.)

(1 to 7 represent merely the outline of the Plan, and although elaborate plans have been prepared for each item, same are omitted here as they are too intricate.)

At midnight of that day, the draft plan was completed. At the moment of dispersing, Colonel SHIGEFUJI attempted to distribute secret funds to us as campaign funds and automobile fees, (NOTE: These secret funds became a topic of discussion later on) but Lt. Colonel SAKATA and myself flatly refused to accept same as were opposed to the idea. This was due to the personality and clear foresight of Lt. Colonel SAKATA as well as to his proper training from normal times.

Colonel SHIGEFUJI and Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO were frantic with joy as if matters had already become accomplished. But I could not help from noticing some serious defects in the plans on viewing same as a whole; as for example, there was, above all, no link whatsoever with any constructive plan, apart from the absence of any fact to prove that the planned time was best suited; also the idea of trying to cooperate with persons outside of the military circles, especially with such a person as Dr. OKAWA.

On Feb. 8th, at 9 a.m. Colonel SHIGEFUJI and others of the previous day met together at the residence of Major General TATEKAWA, where we discussed the plans for seizing the destroyed political regime and decided to submit same to General UGAKI. (NOTE: Although Plans I and II were drafted, the fundamental principle of this plan was the same, the outline of which is as mentioned above.)

Everything was so arranged by now that we merely had to wait for the scheduled date.

However, the reports that came to me since then were all of an extremely dubious nature; for instance, that the attitude of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, who was said to be most ardent as regards the execution of the plan, had become softened; that it seemed that Colonels NAGATA and OKAMURA had started to take an active opposition campaign; that the Vice-Minister of War showed in his attitude that he was becoming inclined to oppose same in general. Above all, the ambitions of the Asst. Chief of General Staff in regard to the Reform were extremely despicable (it being said that he was dreaming /of becoming the War Minister in the UGAKI Cabinet). Everyone acted in his own way as he pleased without any unity of action whatsoever, and failed to give even a single piece of information (under my active seeking for connections in all directions, I have ascertained the facts that the mobilization of 10,000 persons by Dr. OKAWA, to which grave significance has been given, was very doubtful; and that Dr. OKAWA and Colonel SHIGEFUJI, who had both indulged night after night in extravagant pleasure at ARAKI-Ch., Yotsuba, very imprudently let out such remarks in the presence of Geisha girls that their lives were at stake even till tomorrow. Above all what disappointed me most was that no study whatsoever had been made of the construction plan, platform of the principles, and the policies (NOTE: This point can be proven by judging matters whereby, according to the remarks of Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Colonel YAMANAKI of the General Staff, who had been very enthusiastic about the Reform at that time, asked me to lend him something that constituted a study of the platform and policies regarding the construction of a future society, and that the Colonel told me that, although the Chief of the Military Service Section appeared to have some plans, he was in reality greatly embarrassed).

This the contemplated Reform did not display a real reconstruction of a nation and a sincere spirit, but represented merely an act of recourse to violence whereby the debased attempts of seizing the reins of government by political parties were still further aggravated by being based upon the despicable ideals of trying to satisfy their own selfish and base ends by utilizing the Emperor's Army for their own private purpose. This applies also to General UGAKI as well as the Asst. Chief of the General Staff. We can not help resolutely opposing a Reform of this nature. We have become faced with the necessity of checking this reckless attempt. Fortunately, Colonels NAGATA and OKAMURA started a positive opposition movement. Lt. Colonel SUZUKI also is against it. Especially, Lt. Colonel SUZUKI kept a very close connection with Lt. Colonel SAKATA. Time elapsed very swiftly. At last the joint Speech Meeting against the Cabinet by the Three Proletarian Parties was held as per scheduled plan. However, we were indeed amazed at its small scale and low-spiritedness. When we had an interview with ASOH Hisashi, Leader of the TAISHU-TO Party and a leading figure of the then Proletarian Parties, he made it clear that the mass meeting of ten thousand people was nothing but a fantastic dream, as he had very little connection with Dr. OKAWA. We tried to persuade Colonel SHIGEFUJI and Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, who were extreme

radicals, as we decided that, from every point of view, it was the wisest policy to stop same by all means. However, elaborately we tried to explain the situation, they refused to listen to us and blindly pushed ahead with their plans. Finally, Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO delivered to the henchmen of Dr. OKAWA three hundred bombs (small ones as mentioned above). (NOTE: Repeated damage was done by these bombs.) At the result of this an inseparable and close relationship was formed between Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and Dr. OKAWA.

However, blindly Colonel SWIGEFUJI and Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO pushed ahead, they could do nothing against the general trend of the times. It is said that General UGAKI finally summoned Dr. OKAWA and told him to put things off as the time was not opportune. Dr. OKAWA consented to this. Hereupon, the so-called "March Incident" came to an end without being carried out. However, on the other hand, this stimulated Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and his radical associates and also made it clear that some of the high-ranking officers of the Central /T.N. Tokyo/ Headquarters had participated in the Reform. By force of circumstances, therefore, it gave us a strong conception that they were compelled to support the next reform, resulting in preparations being made for the so-called "October Incident".

Concerning the so-called "March Incident", the points worthy of attention are as follows:

- 1) Difference between a reform of the Rule of Righteousness /T.N. "CDO"/ and one of military government.
- 2) Thorough plans, especially Constructive Plan --Constructive Plan and Destructive Plan.
- 3) Time of Reform.
- 4) Preparations from ordinary times as well as Establishment of the Guiding Spirit and Guiding Principle.
- 5) Control, unification and liaison.
- 6) Question of Liaison with persons outside of military circles.
- 7) Question of use of secret funds.

With the failure of the "March Incident", Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO devoted himself to enlarging and strengthening the SAKURA-KAI. By this, he made the actions of the SAKURA-KAI very active and acute, at a result of which the speech and action of the leading figures of the SAKURA-KAI became very violent. Simultaneously with this, bitter criticisms were made regarding the indulging in extravagant pleasures by certain persons among the leading figures of the Society, by saying that several leading figures of the SAKURA-KAI had been frequently indulging in extravagant pleasures under the pretext of studying matters and establishing the said Society's guidance policy.

Those who knew of it charged them of exploiting the SAKURA-KAI by misappropriating the secret funds of the March Incident for their own private use. On asking a certain leading figure of this criticism he said that this probably referred to the extravagant pleasures indulged in by Colonel SHIGEMOTO and Dr. OKAMI concerning the March Incident. Which opinion is really true? At any rate, the internal discrepancies of the SAKURA-KAI thus became enlarged, and signs of an eventual split became evident. Therefore, we concluded that the effect of the various problems mentioned above would surely make the SAKURA-KAI fall into a dreadful abyss.

We made the following proposal at the regular meeting held in the middle of June in 1931 for the purpose of rescuing the SAKURA-KAI and make it enjoy a normal growth - namely, we checked the SAKURA-KAI from engaging in any pursuit rashly without a plan of logical construction and without grasping the mass psychology of the people; also so that the SAKURA-KAI should not be utilized as a tool for realizing anyone's personal ambitions, and protecting such from disintegration and dissolution, thereby making the SAKURA-KAI sufficiently able to execute its original plans at time of emergency.

In other words, the gist of the aforementioned proposal was:- "the leading figures of the SAKURA-KAI at least should understand the matters necessary for the reconstruction of a nation from psychology, social science, ethics, economics and political science and so on, with a view to formulating the guiding spirit of the SAKURA-KAI itself and the essential points of its actions. We should, first of all, invite the proper scholars and obtain our aim by means of friendly talks with them. On the other hand it is very good for us to have a body formed by such proper scholars that may come into use at some later date, by carefully judging their personality and knowledge (views)."

Fortunately, our proposal was accepted by the executives and it was immediately put into practice. We consulted Transport Corps Captain SUZUKI, a special student of the Imperial University, who had special connections with many professors. We achieved success through his negotiations with them. This undertaking was executed under the leadership of Professor YOSHIDA Seichi towards the latter part of June. However, the executives of the SAKURA-KAI suddenly abolished the undertaking on the ground that scholars generally do not arrive at any conclusion and decision and also lack the power of execution.

I traveled to the KANSAI District from the early part of July by availing myself of my vacation. A certain problem centered around the SAKURA-KAI cropped up during this trip - namely, the executives of the SAKURA-KAI, as a step towards the speedy acquisition of members and for the sake of a nationwide campaign, held a meeting, from both horizontal and vertical directions, of low-ranking officers after the 28th term in Tokyo and drafted out a manifesto which was sent out to all the low-ranking officers (after the 28th term) in Japan. The criticisms concerning this matter are varied. However, as far as only the SAKURA-KAI is concerned, it is adjudged that unexpectedly favorable results were obtained.

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The executives of the Society were observed as being highly elated. This impression was of the time when I had an interview with Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and the officers of the Russian Section of the General Staff after my return to Tokyo on the 4th of August. In this way, the so-called October Incident was to break out.

世界文化

昭和二十一年三月號

陸軍ヲ祝史「三月」十月、事件の真相

田中少佐手記

ウリの抜萃

Doc 1402 - A Cut attached.

所謂三月事件

一月九日夜、宇垣大將は政界に來り其上内閣を組織すべく
決心を固めたり。

一月十三日、宇垣大將は杉山政官、二宮次長、小磯軍務局長、建
川部長、山勘（作戦）課長、軍事課長（組）、當日は代理鈴木
貞一中佐（橋本中佐、根本中佐と共に國內改造の為に此の方
法手段を協議す。（確實寫真報）

昭和六年一月初旬、參謀次長二宮中將は橋本中佐に對して左
の要旨を下す。曰く

前々々々宇垣大將は東京に就き、変革のために必要な計画
を作成し出でます。

橋本中流は二言を信し、直ちに坂田中佐及吾と陸軍有調査
班の支室に伴ひ、次長の言ふに従ひ、船を活動するため計画を
作成へることとする。

次に坂田中佐は吾は宇垣大將二宮中將の人物、櫻會に對
す。せ評たるとして處處に此の二名と信す。不可にて危險あると思
い、一應次長の本心を確か可と計画は二案を作つて二二（二案
は眞個の変革案にて構會終局の目的を割り出すも、他つ
一案はカーフラードのものにて之に不適構會日は極めて温健

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No.3

而も時日、空へは計画す。唯、實地計畫監督等
計畫を作らしむれり、當時此の計畫未だ上於必要なる事にて
種々得らる所、如きたり。

- 1 軍首腦等が衆出ること、又司勢甚に銳し
- 2 軍隊の運動準備は暗で裡に出本あり
- 3 忠臣たち資金は機会費として取り戻す支出す
- 4 大川周明博士は無産階級主として大眾宣傳（萬人）を爲す大
元隊長暴傑（參加）にて決定
- 5 漢行の時機は運動立案上程の日とする

6 上司との連絡は橋本中佐とする（吾は以上の諸件細部に就く、及問
うも得る所なし。註、後日確かじる所には本件、此の情報中12は該
點の大筋をもつて、3は實際的には一部支出、4は事實）

之を要するに、軍部今回の策は總て一つウチタムに過
て、吾は極めて限られた範囲にて兵力行使ウチテノ実現計畫一
を作ることなり。且上級者は熱心に他の建設業者等も之に心
ひ下さ、而も時日は迫し、立安の思料に立しく、殊に何等の紙制甚
く各自勝手なる行動玉体りあり。殊に重藤大佐は大川博士と手を握
り、無軌道的口毎産業と連絡し、仄聞する所によれば、破壊計畫立
案未しつありと云ふ。

二月七日午後三時過、昌川に在る重藤大佐宅に集合す。會す者坂
田中佐、根本中佐、及吾也。

重藤大佐は吾に云ふ「既に根本中佐と本知りあひ人も、今回の更
革に際しては、大財團以下を参加しておる」とことわらじ。即ち人
けは特例とす。然し萬一不成功の場合は於ても、決して遺族の生活に

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卷之六

卷之六

Oct 1402-A

宇垣人将を首相とす。内閣より信頼す。今や國家
は重人の時機に会す。宣へ善處せらるべ。——
職を決行せり。

6. 敦原代理以下辭表を提出せし。

7. 大命は宇垣人将に降下す。如く、豫の準備を所
に従ひ策動す。内院官殿及西園寺公の使者を決
定す。

↑↑↑は計画の大綱なり。各之に就て細部の計画を立てる
セラ。繁雑に亘るミツア略す。

此日夜半計画は成る。解散せん時、重藤人
佐は各自に軍事費、自動車代等機密費を分配せん
たり。此機密費は一月後日向問題となり坂田中
佐とは断乎として反対し遂に受けた。是れ坂田中
佐の人爲り尤見分明。平時より指導適切なり。
帰す。

重藤人佐、橋本中佐は既に事成り。せく狂喜せり。
次第は其の計画全般の見透しに於て重人の勝負
あるを認めざるを得ず。軍部外の者、特に大川博士
の如き人物と若同志とせよ點、時機と見ゆ可也何
より無き所。特に建設計画と連繫する皆悉く存等
是れ也。

1月18日前九時、前日の重藤人佐次下達川少将元
大將は破壊政権奪取計画を討議し確定し之を宇垣
人将に示す。計画は才二月日本工作事

1402-A

總之有二。其一根本主義，同一「仁」並開揚。如是大
公今之其決行。由是得行。以不為小。

局長能度。轉化也。永田園町兩太佐曰福極的：
反對向始也。陸軍次官曰其。能度大作於反
行。傾向。詳參謀次長。我輩行可。心意是
極以了體者。有。一日。宇垣内閣。下於陸相
立舊之古。及自是。統制。之權。行軍。一。情
報事與。是。是。進入連終水。中。人。是。是。
大博士。重藤太佐。四本。不可。于。連被蒙遊
前。了。外。少。如。守。之。就。中。是。火。望。セ。の。下。建設
計画主義。綱領政。業。新。是。ア。所。究。皆。否。不。也。
註。此。是。河。稱。李。佐。吉。言。特。善。寢。草。平。熱。心。引
參謀本部。山。勝。太。佐。以。木。未。來。會。建設。た。り。綱。領
政。綱。政。宋。所。究。也。是。も。少。用。ト。下。に。未。の。た。
豈。並。以。同。大。征。吉。吉。軍。事。課。表。書。少。は。多。事。多。
シ。が。寢。は。困。了。居。3。と。リ。里。者。4。判。斷。対。人。証。セ。已。
精神。有。セ。ニ。此。手。ア。令。莫。石。政。業。者。流。政。權。金。高。

✓. 6

No. 7

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行動する層次化、陛下陛下の御心に於ける御心を
満足せんとする、寧ろむく心情を基底とする成る御心
行動にうかべ、宇垣大将然つて參謀次長なりとす。
又之に此の如き性質は變革の断手とした反計
大さく得て、今大此の御心を阻止するに以て見え。
幸いに木田園村内大臣、積極的反対運動あり。
余木中佐反計者特に余木中佐坂田中佐三位
しり密接行々連撃を行ひ。而して時日も連続して
遂に豫定計画を実現三派連合の内閣攻撃演説会
議会開かれたり。然して甚だ規模小形勢不振
等は警けり。又其時三派連合に八衆宣
之首麻生久と会见せる時、大川博士に向て連絡を了
浦、一人勧貢、せきは全く本意の事無想^シと思^シ
至明^ニ也。

最初に行動の見手断行中止するを眞明^ニ書く
音を失^フ最後に連合子たる重藤中佐橋本中佐
を説得^シとす。此のとおりに行^フ之の情勢を説述^シ
了す頃を頃^シ却て益々小気病的と云ふ旨進^シと
聽^ク。遂に橋本中佐が爆弾前掲^シせしも^シ
三百個を大川博士の部下に交付せり(註此の爆弾
は厚^シ御^セ)。此の結果橋本中佐と大川博士に向^テ
て一切^シりござる腐小縁が絶^シる。至る所
重藤大佐橋本中佐が如何に首進^シて大勢^シは
せ行^シらずからず、宇垣大将も遂に大川博士を致^シ

16.8

三月事件において機密費を出し、あは等々難す。
稱し屡々豪遊と能縛し之を知ら者は彼等が櫻倶会を好んで
居る者たる者は必ず研究同會指導するの策立等の行為
豪遊に対する激烈な非難が起らる。即ち櫻倶会幹部中の或
の言動激越しかれり。之れと同時に同會幹部中の一部の
を擴大強化し其の行動を洛濱尖銳化せりの同會幹部の
三月事件不成功に終るや橋本砲兵中佐は銃意櫻倶会

7. 機密費使用の問題

6. 軍部外の者の連繫問題

5. 統制統一連繫

4. 平素よりの懇惫指道精神及指道原の確立

3. 改革の時機

機密費

2. 周到なる計画、特に建設計画と改修計画との破

1. 新朝道の改革と王道の改革の差

所謂三月事件に關聯する注文す件

備備せらる形なり。

る能は、何の觀念を堅く抱かしめ所謂十月事件を

者あるを明にし行は縣に上次回の改革には不同意な

子を刺殺し且中央部の高級將校中改革に加擔せらる

待は未遂に終れりと雖、却つて橋本中佐はの急進合

傳へたり」と云ふ。大内博士は之を當てて該に前月三月事

して今時は時機適當である。以上中止した

KOC 1402-A

Oct 1402-A

No. 9

吾が某幹部は、前記の如きに就いての結果、此の本集は恐れ
三日事件に関する重宗大臣会見の實録を指すもの
人、果して何れかを察するやうに於て機會は斯くても得て、而
を擴大し、今後本の収録出でたるやうがあり。

吾々前記せり。前記の結果は、實録として恐る可らず、而
は後セリ。もろもろ人々判断し之故に清並に實録として其事
の全譲^をを今や一概に其の如きの如く清並に實録として其事^を大變の如
把柄事無くして理釋^を示す。而して所持し候^を、
さへ自己野望を遺せば、其處外の見に深むるに付し
しめ、其の如誰解説を遺せば、以下有事の日議會本席の
企圖^を所^を遂^行す上に於て、所世^をうむる所^をある。而
六年六月中旬の開會の席上、一派^を不^爲せり。即ち實録
、自体の指導^を精神及行動的綱領^を有するに由^さキモ^レ
部級は哲學^を社會^を、倫理^を不^爲、基督教^を政治^を等^をの
中より國家改造^を外に精神を運転^{せし}之が如^き半^て
學者^を相^{して}、總説的^に其の目的^を達成^{せし}一面^が半^て
るに依り、學者^{甚^く有}の人物^{誠意^をを}看破^し、痛^苦せり。
者^を以て一つの團體^を結成^し後日^は彼^は之^を下^に而^も傳^ひせ
りす。この要旨^を日^々論述^{せられ}。

實^には吾名實^は是^は本集の名^を示^す。直^に之^を実行
す^べし^{せり}。乃ち吾實^は之^を申^す。而^も實^は講^は坐^す。特^殊の關係
を^もくの學校^に有^す。第^二編^は重兵大尉^に對^{する}實^は行^はし
が成功^{せし}。此の實^は六月^{下旬}。吾田實^は實^は之^を取^り、

A-2-2-2

202

11/6/1947

證 言

余因申請以此海道一帶別字畫黑一
處居住。余八月五日，即到物主成化世界文化
十九百零六年三月所訂，八月十日事件，
在上題人論文《餘南洋事件證明》。
余《更正記》記事，十七年三月日本陸軍大
將軍，條余，祇等十二論文，據案十二
事記論文中之念，多知識，當時余之念
之機會，余嘗與友人等共同會於牛心堂
知識並行動，或以大陸專為調查課二部
務之，而余，行之，為調查課，得上記事
之記，且余，知，信不假，是正三月十
九日，證明。

余，李方，西漢，署名捺印

證人

1947年11月11日 JOHN F. MUNK

國際調查委員會

一九四七年十一月十一日 當事人

THE SO-CALLED OCTOBER INCIDENT

(Words were originally concealed
where underscored)

When I met Lieutenant Colonel HASHIMOTO on August 4, he said, "Around the middle of September this year, the K'ANTUNG Army will carry out a plot which will create an opportunity to settle the Manchuria and Mongolia problem. The nation should internally seize this opportunity and carry out a fundamental reform, etc. The leading personnel of the General Staff have a thorough understanding of the domestic reorganization problem." (Note: The extent of this understanding is unknown. Is it a concrete understanding or does it indicate an item added to the estimate of the general situation?) The same Lt. Colonel added, "Therefore, in order for the political power to come to the military, or in other words, in order that the military as the nucleus can seize the political power, I want the draft of the plan prepared by around the beginning of September. The political programmes and policies will be studied and planned after seizing the power, etc." I promised to draft a plan of propaganda by attacking the corruption of the political parties and by arousing the indignation of the people, bring about a natural destruction of the parties. The Lt. Colonel agreed to this.

I again took a trip on August 10th, and reached Hokkaido.

During my absence, the Cherry Association /T.N. SAKURA-KAI/ held their regular August meeting at the KAIKOSHA. The Association carried out a complete turnabout in its policies at this meeting and resolved to become a cultural body with no connection whatsoever with the problems of the current situation.

This is an extremely grave problem. This change into a cultural body is nothing more than a mere outward appearance. It is nothing more than the plot by radical elements led by the Russian and Chinese groups who are planning a domestic reformation. (This incident later became clear through the direct story of a radical element.)

The Outbreak of the MANCHURIA-MONGOLIA Problem on September 18th.

On that morning I called on Lt. Colonel SAKAMOTO at the War Ministry and Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO at the General Staff Headquarters and learned the true circumstances of the Incident. At the same time it became clear that the reformation was not to be carried out when Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO said to me, "Since it has been decided that the domestic reformation should not be carried out at this time, I will return the propaganda plan to you for the time being, so I want you to give it further study." I believed Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO's words and thought that

the domestic reformation will not be carried out and instead that only the settlement of the Manchuria-Mongolia problem will be strived for.

However, on the night of October 3rd, I received a special delivery letter (sealed letter) from Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO. The letter stated: "I have something to discuss with you tomorrow the 4th, so please come to the MANKIN at Norigasaki. I shall be waiting there, etc." (Exactly as in the original text). (The postmark was KYOBASHI SHINTOMICHO). I went to the MANKIN at the prescribed location on October 4th with the premonition that something would happen, gathering from the meeting place and the mailing point. When I told the proprietor that I had come to call on Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, he asked my name, identification, etc., which he transmitted upstairs after which he finally ushered me inside. Those present were Major CHO who was sent to China to be stationed there as an attache, Captain TANAKA, Ya, and Captain CHARA (Obara) of the Russian Section of the General Staff Headquarters.

They said: "The domestic reformation will now take place." "The War Ministry, General Staff Headquarters, and the 1st KOMOYE Division are all preparing for the domestic reformation, and the Navy is also doing likewise."

"First the political power will be seized by the military through a 'coup d'etat', organize a dictatorship and carry out the domestic reformation."

"The Cherry Association 'T.N. SAKU'A-KAI' is in the midst of activities as the nucleus." (Note: These are statements made to everyone, especially to officers attached to units, in order to get them to join the movement.) With these words they demanded that I join them. They added: "Since the outbreak of the Manchuria-Mongolia Problem, we have been exerting efforts, day and night, in order to bring about changes, and have gone home only two or three times. We want you to join us and help the plan."

I was astonished at the unexpected turn of events. However, I had doubts, and my doubts are shown in the points of discussion between them and myself, a part of which is as follows: (The questions are by me, and the answers are by them.)

Q. "If the nucleus of the military is participating in the domestic reformation, there undoubtedly must exist principles, creeds and policies for the future social construction which they are planning. What are their contents?"

A. "They are secrets and cannot be revealed. We don't know their details either."

- Q. "What plan is it which you men have been working on days and nights since the outbreak of the Incident?"
- A. "It is the plan of destruction."
- Q. "A plan of destruction should be made after completing the plan of construction and should be within the scope of the latter. That is, don't you think both plans should follow a consistent idea? Don't you think it unreasonable to form a plan of destruction without knowing what the plan of construction is?"
- A. "The plan of construction is now being prepared by others."
- Q. "Whom do you mean by others?"
- A. "The faction led by Dr. OKAWA, Shumei."
- Q. "Generally, what kind of destruction will be carried out?"
- A. "Intimidation by the naval bombing unit. The massacre of all the ministers at the Cabinet Conference held at the Premier's official residence. The seizing of the Metropolitan Police Board by attacking suddenly."
- Q. "Why do you consider these destructions necessary?"
- A. "It is necessary for the eradication of the ringleader."
- Q. "Is the internal reorganization possible through such destructions?"
- A. "The reformation is possible by destroying the political nucleus."
- Q. "For example, what will be done for the reformation in the economic field? Have you considered this?"
- A. Silence.
- Q. "As far as I know, Dr. OKAWA is not a constructive man. This was duly proven in the March Incident. In spite of this, has the Army leaders become so feeble as to entrust such a man with the most important construction plan?"
- A. "To tell you the truth, we haven't contacted the central leading figure of the Army yet, but we will get them to agree with us just prior to the action. That is why we are having Dr. OKAWA draw up the plan of construction."

Doc 1402-13 Cont. attached

世界文代昭和三十一年三月号

陸軍の歴史三月十日事件眞相田中少佐手記

所謂十月事件

八月四日吾に橋本平佐会せ時同中佐^は言ふ「本年九月中旬東軍に於て陰謀を行ひ満蒙問題解決機会を作らしく國內は立契機にて根本的變革を敢行せらるべきなり云々。而し國內改造問題は參謀本部首腦部には十分諒解有りと註此諒解は何れの程度よりか明なり或は是作的諒解、情勢判断中加へたる事項を指示せらるべ」

更に同中佐は言ふ「此の如きを以て軍部に政權奪取なり更言すれば軍部を中心とす政權奪取たりの計画未至月初旬迄構成せられし政綱政策は政權奪取後乃ち政黨立派する云々と吾は政黨の腐敗墮落を攻撃し國民大衆を憤起せり自然的に政黨の崩解を招來せりとなり宣傳文章を構成すべきを約す中佐は之に同す」

吾は八月廿二日再び旅行し北海道に至る。

吾不在中櫻会は八月例会を催行社に於て催す此会合に於て同会は百八十度の方向裏換を行ひ修養園作事務を申し合はれ一切の局向問題は關係せざる事なり是れ甚だ大なる問題なり。この修養園作には單なる表面的紛糾に過ぎず國內變革を企図せる意進分子を示す人とするに過ぎず此件は後日急進分子より直話により明かとなり

九月十八日満蒙問題が發

吾は此朝陸軍省坂田中佐參謀本部橋本中佐を訪ね事件の眞相を明かにすと曰く橋本中佐「今回は國內變革を行はんことをせんに付し宣傳文章は底返却す」と訴え

Mo2

200 1402-03

吾兄橋本中佐吉吉信、國內渡御天行小舟、唯消息
向題解決、遣進士人回入。
此二十日亥正曜旦橋本中佐、速達(封書)打
文二言、小明四日打金有之候同奉于崎、萬金傳云下被
下待入候勿(序文)、僅(消印)京橋已新宿町(上)吾
感之、十四日所示、地矣、至。
萬金至、橋本中佐乞請此下主一人傳入、
身合氏名、年半付之向之五階上傳、始之吾家内也。
在室了者、何最近支那駐在武官、ナガサキ長少佐、
參謀本部軍務班。由中彌太郎火薦、小原大臣^三知
彼寺は謂小

更：研究一題道地此處「山中波」水與茶葉，不虞施玉明「七。

更：研究一回，直到从廣「申」渡江，以求其詳，不虞迄未明之也。

Doc 1402-13

- 答、彼等との誤論の一部を想ひて、吾の疑問
とせう所を追はん。(1月14日)
- 同、國內變革に軍部中杞參加せずせば、恐らく
其の企図日本未來社会建設なり主義調査院政策は
存在矣。如何なる内政なりか是。
答、秘密にて示し得ず。吾等亦之を精く知らず。
同、君等事件を主張未だ書未だ所では何の計画なり。
答、破壊計画なり。
- 同、破壊計画は建設計画上より甚の範圍内に於て作ら
き。兩者は一貫せう思想に従属するもの非ず也。
建設計画を明かにして破壊計画は不合理ならず。
答、建設計画は他に於て立案中。
- 同、向、他とは。
- 答、大川周明博士を中心とする洋派、
同人等に於て如何なる破壊を行ふ也。
答、海軍の爆撃隊による威嚇。
- 同、首相官邸に於ける閣議席上に於て大臣會。車毅
整言視厳。參謀奪取。
- 同、何が是等の破壊を必要とする也。
- 答、元老、一掃のべく必要なり。
- 同、此の如き破壊により國内改造は可能なり也。
- 答、政治の中杞を破壊すれば、其變革は出來得。
答、例は經濟方面の變革は如何する、又之不考慮あるべく、
默す。

Log 1402-13

No. 4

事件一：「向、孟知札を範囲に於ける。大川博士は建設者に非ず。三月
設計書を託する程、陸軍中央部は消耗甚しく。事件二：「向、孟試験官に於ける。此の参考に最も重視する建
設設計書を託する程、陸軍中央部は消耗甚しく。合、美は未だ軍。中枢部首脳者には連絡なし。決行。
直前二月十三日、同月十七日、之の為めに大川博士にて建
設設計書を立てる事にあり。

余 / 1942-6

證詞

余由中清人北海通川後到門寧寧寧寧寧
余十五日，即別物貿易世界文化主辦會之
三日，所載之月十日事件，其相應之論文
檢閱下之證明。

余之西人記記事（年紀）二十三年日本侵華
開始，除余就筆之論文外，後奉了心口並
上記論文之命令，知悉當時余之會議員之
體會，會是此友人等不同會於此余，如
議在行動或又陸續省調查課之勸善及
同余行公約調查中得悉之者，下此，且
余知之信之很真，于立于毛子，于立于
證明。

六月廿九日/年清/署名余印/

證人

約翰·F·門羅/JOHNSON F. MUNROE/
國際檢察部 調查課

一九四七年十一月二日 聖安德烈市署名又

11/6 5